Threats
T1600Wireless Attacks
A detailed guide to wireless attacks for SOC analysts — WPA2/WPA3 cracking, Evil Twin, deauthentication attacks, KRACK, Bluetooth BlueBorne, RFID cloning, and detection techniques for wireless intrusion.
View on Graph
How Wireless Attacks Work and Why They Matter
- Wireless attacks target the radio frequency (RF) layer of network communications — 802.11 (Wi-Fi), Bluetooth, and RFID/NFC — where the transmission medium is inherently shared and unencrypted by default.
- MITRE ATT&CK maps wireless attacks to
T1600(Weaken Encryption) with sub-techniques includingT1600.002(Disable Wi-Fi Encryption) andT1557.004(Man-in-the-Middle via Wireless Evil Twin). - Wireless attacks matter because they bypass physical security controls: an attacker in the parking lot can compromise a network without ever entering the building. For SOC analysts, wireless threats often appear as network anomalies that are difficult to attribute without RF-layer telemetry.
- The most common wireless attack categories are credential cracking (WPA2/WPA3 PSK), rogue access points (Evil Twin), denial of service (deauthentication floods), protocol attacks (KRACK), Bluetooth exploits (BlueBorne), and RFID cloning.
WPA2/WPA3 PSK Cracking
How It Works
PSK (Pre-Shared Key) cracking requires capturing the four-way handshake between a client and access point (WPA2) or the SAE handshake (WPA3), then performing an offline brute-force or dictionary attack against the passphrase.
| Attack Type | Handshake Captured | Required | Cracking Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| WPA2 PSK | 4-way handshake (EAPOL frames) | Client must attempt to connect | hashcat -m 22000 or aircrack-ng against wordlist |
| WPA2 PMKID | PMKID from beacon frame | No client required — passive capture | hashcat -m 22002 against wordlist |
| WPA3 SAE | SAE handshake | Much harder — dictionary attacks less effective | Dragonblood attack (theoretical; practical attacks rare) |
WPA2 Cracking Workflow
- Enable monitor mode:
sudo airmon-ng start wlan0 - Scan for target access point:
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon - Capture handshake (WPA2):
sudo airodump-ng -c 6 --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -w capture wlan0mon # Force a client to reconnect (deauth attack): sudo aireplay-ng -0 2 -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -c CLIENT_MAC wlan0mon - Or capture PMKID (no client needed):
# PMKID is in the RSN IE of the beacon frame # Use hcxdumptool for PMKID capture: sudo hcxdumptool -i wlan0mon --enable_status=1 -o captured.pcapng - Crack offline:
# Convert to hashcat format hcxpcapngtool -o hash.hc22000 capture-01.cap # Crack with wordlist hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
WPA3 Considerations
WPA3 uses SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), which provides forward secrecy and is resistant to offline dictionary attacks. The Dragonblood attack (disclosed 2019) found vulnerabilities in WPA3 implementations, but practical exploitation requires a vulnerable client or AP. For most SOC environments, WPA3 is significantly more secure than WPA2-PSK.
Evil Twin — The Rogue Access Point
An Evil Twin is a rogue Wi-Fi access point that impersonates a legitimate network. The attacker broadcasts the same SSID with a stronger signal, and clients connect to the attacker’s device instead of the real AP.
Attack Flow
| Step | Action | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Deauth clients from legitimate AP | Clients disconnect and search for the network — similar to DDoS disruption patterns |
| 2 | Broadcast legitimate SSID with stronger signal | Clients auto-connect to the rogue AP |
| 3 | MITM traffic through rogue AP | All client traffic passes through attacker |
| 4 | Capture or modify traffic | Credentials, session tokens, sensitive data |
Detection Indicators
| Indicator | What to Look For | Detection Method |
|---|---|---|
| Duplicate SSID with different BSSID | Two APs broadcasting the same SSID | WIDS scan, airodump-ng |
| Signal strength mismatch | Weak legitimate AP, strong rogue AP near perimeter | Physical site survey, WIPS |
| Rogue AP MAC OUI | MAC address does not match known AP hardware vendor | MAC OUI lookup |
| Deauth flood before rogue appears | High rate of deauth packets followed by new AP | WIDS deauth rate alert |
| Rogue AP channel | Rogue broadcasts on a non-standard or different channel | Channel monitoring |
| Rogue AP beacon interval | Non-standard beacon interval (default is 100ms) | Beacon interval analysis |
SPL — Deauth Flood Detection
index=network sourcetype=wids
| search attack_type="deauth"
| stats count, values(src_mac) as Deauth_Sources by dst_mac, _time
| where count > 100
| eval alert = "DEAUTH FLOOD — " . count . " deauth packets sent to " . dst_mac . " from " . mvjoin(Deauth_Sources, ", ")
| table _time, dst_mac, count, alert
| sort - count
Deauthentication Attacks
Deauth attacks send forged deauthentication frames to disconnect clients from an AP. The attack is trivial because deauth frames in 802.11 (prior to 802.11w-2009) are unencrypted management frames.
Impact
| Environment | Impact | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Enterprise with 802.11w | Protected Management Frames (PMF) prevent deauth spoofing | Low — must use other methods |
| Enterprise without 802.11w | Clients can be disconnected at will | High — can be used to force fallback to C2 channels |
| Home/SOHO | No protection against deauth | Critical |
| IoT devices | Many IoT devices don’t support PMF | Critical — attackers can force offline behavior |
Detection
index=network sourcetype=wids
| search frame_type="management" AND subtype="deauthentication"
| stats count, values(src_mac) as Sources by dst_mac
| where count > 50 AND mvcount(Sources) < 3
| eval alert = "DEAUTH FLOOD from " . mvjoin(Sources, ", ") . " targeting " . dst_mac
| table _time, dst_mac, Sources, count, alert
KRACK — Key Reinstallation Attack
KRACK (Key Reinstallation Attack, disclosed 2017) exploits a vulnerability in the WPA2 four-way handshake where an attacker forces the client to reinstall an already-in-use key, resetting the nonce and replay counter. This allows decryption of subsequent packets.
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2017-13077 through CVE-2017-13088 |
| Affected protocol | WPA2 (four-way handshake, group key handshake, Fast BSS Transition) |
| Impact | Attacker can decrypt, replay, and forge packets |
| Fix | Patch the client and AP — most vendors released patches in 2017-2018 |
| Current status | Widely patched but unpatched IoT devices remain vulnerable |
| Detection | Repeated EAPOL message 3 retransmissions in short timeframe |
Detection — repeated EAPOL frames (possible KRACK exploitation):
index=network sourcetype=wids
| search frame_type="EAPOL"
| stats count by src_mac, dst_mac
| where count > 10 AND count < 50
| eval alert = "Repeated EAPOL frames from " . src_mac . " to " . dst_mac . " — possible KRACK attempt"
| table _time, src_mac, dst_mac, count, alert
BlueBorne — Bluetooth Exploitation
BlueBorne is a set of 8 Bluetooth vulnerabilities disclosed in 2017 that affect Android, iOS, Windows, and Linux devices. The critical difference from other Bluetooth attacks: BlueBorne works without pairing, and the target device does not need to be in discoverable mode.
| CVE | Component | Impact | Affected Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2017-0781 | Android Bluetooth stack | RCE | Android 4.4 - 8.0 |
| CVE-2017-8628 | Windows Bluetooth stack | RCE | Windows 7 - 10 |
| CVE-2017-14315 | iOS Bluetooth stack | RCE | iOS 9.3.5, 10.3.3 |
| CVE-2017-1000251 | Linux BlueZ kernel stack | RCE | Linux kernel 3.x - 4.14 |
| CVE-2017-0785 | Android Bluetooth info leak | Information disclosure | Android 4.4 - 8.0 |
Detection
| Indicator | What It Looks Like |
|---|---|
| Unusual Bluetooth traffic volume | Bluetooth packets from devices that never normally use Bluetooth |
| BT traffic when Bluetooth should be off | Devices with Bluetooth disabled transmitting |
| Multiple Bluetooth probes to the same device | Repeated L2CAP echo requests from different BT MACs |
| Process monitoring | btusb.sys (Windows), bluetoothd (Linux) showing unusual CPU or memory |
RFID Cloning
RFID cloning copies the data from a low-frequency (125 kHz) or high-frequency (13.56 MHz) RFID tag to a programmable blank tag, allowing the attacker to impersonate the legitimate credential.
| Tag Type | Frequency | Cloning Difficulty | Typical Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| EM4100 / EM4x | 125 kHz | Trivial — read and replay | Older access control badges |
| MIFARE Classic | 13.56 MHz | Easy — CRYPTO1 cipher broken | Widespread access control, transit cards |
| MIFARE DESFire | 13.56 MHz | Difficult — AES encrypted | Modern access control |
| HID iCLASS | 13.56 MHz | Moderate — requires specialized reader/writer | Enterprise access control |
| NFC (NDEF) | 13.56 MHz | Trivial — simple read/write | Payment, phone-based access |
Detection
| Detection Method | What It Catches |
|---|---|
| Two-factor authentication | Badge + PIN — cloned badge alone doesn’t work |
| Antipassback | Same badge used at two doors simultaneously = duplication detected |
| Access pattern analysis | Badge used at door at physically impossible speed |
| Log correlation | Badge + timing + CCTV correlation |
Defense in Depth for Wireless
| Control | What It Prevents | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| 802.11w (PMF) | Deauth attacks, forged management frames | Enable on all enterprise APs |
| WPA3-Enterprise | PSK cracking, KRACK | Migrate from WPA2 to WPA3 |
| WIDS/WIPS | Rogue APs, deauth floods | Dedicated wireless sensors or AP-based monitoring |
| MAC address filtering (supplemental) | Guest device blocking | Low-value — easily spoofed, but reduces noise; a common insider threat vector |
| EAP-TLS (certificate auth) | Credential theft (PEAP-MSCHAPv2 is crackable) | Deploy 802.1X with machine and user certificates — common in cloud hybrid deployments |
| Bluetooth disable policy | BlueBorne, Bluetooth MITM | GPO to disable Bluetooth on endpoints where not needed |
| Antipassback (physical) | RFID clone reuse | Access control system setting |
| Physical site survey | Rogue AP detection by walking perimeter | Quarterly WIDS sweeps |
Related
- Man-in-the-Middle — detection and response for T1557 techniques
- Network Security Basics — detection and response for T1040, T1046 techniques
- Snort and Suricata — detection and response for T1040 techniques
- DDoS — how ddos attacks work and how to detect them
