Playbooks

T1588.006

Zero Day & CVE Response

A SOC playbook for responding to zero-day vulnerabilities and critical CVEs — vulnerability disclosure triage, patch prioritization, compensating controls, virtual patching, and attacker activity monitoring.

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What Zero Day Response Covers and When to Activate

  • A zero-day vulnerability is a software flaw that is either (a) publicly disclosed without a vendor patch, (b) actively exploited before the vendor knows about it, or (c) disclosed via CVE with a critical score and active exploit code in the wild.
  • MITRE ATT&CK maps vulnerability exploitation to T1588.006 (Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities) — attackers weaponize CVEs to gain initial access, escalate privileges, or bypass defenses.
  • Activate this playbook when: (1) A CVE is published with CVSS 9.0+ and active exploit code, (2) CISA publishes a Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV) alert relevant to your environment, (3) A vendor releases an emergency patch for an actively exploited vulnerability, or (4) Your organization’s threat intel team reports active exploitation of a zero-day affecting your tech stack.

Step 1: Triage the Disclosure (First 30 Minutes)

Information Gathering

When a new CVE or zero-day is announced, collect:

FieldWhat to DocumentSource
CVE IDStandard identifierNVD, MITRE
CVSS ScoreSeverity rating (0-10)NVD
Affected productsSoftware, version rangesVendor advisory
ExploitabilityAttack vector, complexity, privileges needed, user interactionCVSS vector string
Known exploitsPublic PoC, Metasploit module, exploit kit inclusionGitHub, Exploit-DB, CISA KEV
Active exploitationReports of in-the-wild exploitationCISA, vendor blog, threat intel
Vendor patch statusPatch available, workaround only, or no fix yetVendor security advisory

Triage Decision Matrix

CVE ProfilePriorityResponse Timeline
CVSS 9.0+ + Active exploitation + Public PoCCriticalBegin immediately. Emergency patching
CVSS 7.0-8.9 + Active exploitationHighBegin same day. Schedule patching within 24h
CVSS 9.0+ + No known exploitation + No PoCHighBegin same day. Test and schedule patching within 72h
CVSS 7.0-8.9 + No exploitation + PoC availableMediumSchedule patching within 7 days
CVSS < 7.0 + No exploitationLowInclude in next patch cycle

Step 2: Asset Discovery and Exposure Assessment (1-2 Hours)

Find Affected Assets

# Search configuration management database (CMDB) for affected software
# Query your asset inventory — crowdstrike, tenable, or CMDB API

# Search SIEM for affected software versions
index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Application
| search ProductName="*VulnerableProduct*" ProductVersion="*affected_ver*"
| stats dc(Computer) as Affected_Systems by ProductName, ProductVersion

Exposure Assessment

AssessmentQuestionMethod
Asset countHow many systems run the vulnerable software?CMDB query, EDR inventory, vulnerability scanner
Network exposureIs the vulnerable service accessible from the internet?Perimeter firewall rules, external port scan
Business criticalityAre the affected systems production, development, or test?CMDB tags, business impact assessment
Data sensitivityWhat data do the affected systems process?Data classification tags, data flow diagrams
Exploit path analysisCan an attacker chain this CVE with other vulnerabilities?Attack path mapping, reachability analysis

Prioritize Systems for Patching

PrioritySystem TypePatching Window
P0Internet-facing, critical data, no compensating controlsEmergency — within hours
P1Internet-facing OR critical dataSame day
P2Internal-facing, production systems24-72 hours
P3Internal non-production, dev/test7 days
P4Air-gapped, isolated, or compensatedNext scheduled maintenance

Step 3: Compensating Controls — Patching Delay Mitigation

When a patch is not immediately available (vendor hasn’t released one, or patching requires a maintenance window), deploy compensating controls:

Network-Level Controls

ControlWorks AgainstImplementation
WAF ruleWeb-based exploits (SQLi, RCE, SSRF)Add virtual patch rule — block known exploit patterns
IPS/IDS signatureNetwork-based exploitationSnort and Suricata rule blocking exploit traffic
Firewall ACLExploits reaching vulnerable servicesBlock source IPs, restrict access to affected ports
Rate limitingBrute-force or DoS exploitationLimit connections per source IP to vulnerable service
DNS RPZC2-based post-exploitationSinkhole known C2 domains

Endpoint-Level Controls

ControlWorks AgainstImplementation
EDR behavioral ruleExploitation behavior (process injection, file creation)Write custom detection rule
ASLR/CFGMemory corruption exploitsEnable system-wide exploit mitigations
AppLockerUnauthorized binary executionEnforce allowlisting on critical systems
Disable vulnerable componentComponent-specific exploitsStop and disable vulnerable service where possible
Registry mitigationRegistry-level exploit mitigationApply vendor-provided registry fix or DisableRestrictedAdmin

Suricata Rule Template for Virtual Patching

# Virtual patch — block exploitation of CVE-YYYY-NNNNN
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET $HTTP_PORTS (
  msg:"CVE-YYYY-NNNNN — virtual patch for remote code execution";
  content:"/vulnerable/endpoint"; http_uri;
  content:"exploit_string"; http_client_body;
  classtype:attempted-admin;
  sid:1000001; rev:1;
  reference:cve,CVE-YYYY-NNNNN;
)

Step 4: Active Exploitation Monitoring

Once you have identified affected assets, monitor for exploitation attempts.

Monitor This Telemetry

Data SourceWhat to MonitorDetection
Web server logsExploit patterns in URI, POST body, headersGrep for exploit-specific strings
IDS/IPS alertsExploit signaturesCheck for alerts matching CVE signature
EDR telemetryProcess creation, network connectionsMonitor for unusual child processes from vulnerable service
Authentication logsPost-exploitation lateral movementMonitor for anomalous admin logins from the vulnerable host
Firewall logsOutbound connections from vulnerable hostsBeacon detection, data exfiltration patterns

SPL — Monitor for Post-Exploitation Activity

index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
| search ParentImage="*vulnerable_service*" OR ParentImage="*httpd*" OR ParentImage="*iis*"
| search Image="*cmd.exe*" OR Image="*powershell.exe*" OR Image="*wscript.exe*"
| stats count, values(CommandLine) as Commands by Computer, Image
| eval alert = "Post-exploitation activity from " . ParentImage . " spawning " . Image . " on " . Computer
| table _time, Computer, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, alert

CVE-Specific Monitoring Checklist

CVE TypeWhat to MonitorExample Detection
Remote Code ExecutionProcess tree from vulnerable serviceIIS spawns cmd.exe — CVE-2021-31166
Privilege EscalationCreateRemoteThread to SYSTEM processWindows kernel exploit — CVE-2024-26234
SQL InjectionUnexpected query patterns in database logsOR 1=1 patterns — CVE-2023-34362
XXE / SSRFOutbound connections from app serversUnexpected HTTP requests from web app to internal IPs
Memory corruptionCrash dumps, application restartsRepeated crash of vulnerable service in short window

Step 5: Patch Deployment and Verification

Deployment Phases

PhaseScopeTiming
Phase 1Dev/test environmentValidate patch compatibility
Phase 2Non-critical productionDeploy to low-risk systems first
Phase 3Critical productionScheduled maintenance window
Phase 4Legacy / exception systemsManual patching or compensating controls

Verification Checklist

# Verify patches are installed
# Windows
wmic qfe list brief /format:texttable
Get-HotFix | Where-Object {$_.HotFixID -eq "KBXXXXXXX"}

# Linux
dpkg -l | grep package_name
rpm -qa | grep package_name

# Verify service restart (if required)
Get-Service -Name vuln_service | Select-Object Status, StartType
systemctl status vulnerable.service

Exception Handling

Systems that cannot be patched must have documented exceptions:

FieldExample
System nameLEGACY-SRV-01
Reason for exceptionVendor EOL, no patch available, application incompatibility
Compensating controlWAF virtual patch + EDR behavioral rule + network segmentation
ApprovalSigned by CISO and system owner
Review date30 days — re-evaluate for patch

Communication Timeline

TimeActionAudience
T+0CVE identified and triagedSOC team only
T+1hInitial assessment — affected assets, severitySOC manager, Security engineering
T+4hCompensating controls deployedSOC team, IT operations
T+8hPatch deployment plan and timelineCISO, IT director
T+24hP0/P1 systems patched or compensatedSecurity leadership
T+72hAll affected systems patched or exceptionedFull stakeholders
T+7dPost-incident reviewSOC team

Sources